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Abstract 
The need for infrastructure building, replacement and updating is large worldwide and governments - 
particularly subnational governments - will need to mobilise budgetary resources while simultaneously 
restoring public finances to sound health and meeting other spending pressures. This paper considers the 
factors affecting investment in infrastructure (with an emphasis on fixed networks), the specific 
characteristics of the different financing modalities applicable to subnational governments and highlights 
the challenges that are specific to subnational governments. In order to rise to the challenge, subnational 
governments will need to enhance their capacity to raise own revenue, to make the most of 
intergovernmental grants and transfers, and to mobilise private-sector funds, including by tapping capital 
markets, where permitted. In order to exploit fully the various financing options, subnational governments 
in many countries will need to strengthen their technical capacity to design and implement investment 
projects, as well as manage increasingly complex, multi-year budgets, especially when there is private 
sector involvement.  
Keywords: infrastructure Investment, decentralisation,  
JEL codes: H40, H54 
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1. Introduction 
 
1. Global infrastructure investment needs are estimated by the OECD at about 2.5 percent of 
world GDP per year in the coming 20 years in the areas of electricity transmission and generation, 
surface transport (roads and rail), telecoms and water. Estimates could rise to some 3.5 percent of 
world GDP if additional energy-related investments (such as oil, gas and coal) are taken into 
account. In the developing world, rapid urbanisation requires increased public investment in 
water, sanitation, transport and urban amenities to meet the needs and demands of a growing 
urban population and to deliver on MDG commitments. Rising incomes in emerging-market 
economies create demands for addressing deficiencies in provision, upgrading existing 
infrastructure and improving access to the underserved population. The need to replace and update 
ageing infrastructure, and to maintain competitiveness in international markets in an increasingly 
tight budgetary environment poses challenges for governments in mature economies to provide 
and finance infrastructure. At the same time, technological change affects the nature of, and scope 
for, government provision of infrastructure services in developing, emerging-market and mature 
economies alike.  
2. The huge resources required to meet infrastructure demands call for combined efforts by 
the government – including the central and subnational administrations, as well as the public 
enterprise sector – and private-sector partners. In particular, where infrastructure provision and 
financing are carried out in a decentralised manner, co-ordination rises in importance, particularly 
when resources are limited. Within the government, co-ordination of infrastructure provision 
amongst subnational jurisdictions, as well as with national priorities and line ministries, is 
required to ensure investment is well designed and not wasteful. At the interface with the private 
sector, governments of all levels need to consider the best arrangements to ensure value for 
money. In this context, the role of subnational governments needs to be set in a broader context of 
government intervention.  
3. Governments intervene in infrastructure provision to address market failures that could 
lead to the under-provision of services, to take into account externalities or public-good features 
when they are predominant, or to limit the exercise of market power in the case of natural 
monopolies. This broader context includes decisions on the ownership structure (public or private) 
of infrastructure, the delivery modalities (pure government provision, public procurement, 
concessions, PPPs, etc.), the financing options for these different modalities (budget 
appropriations, user charges), and the regulatory regime for service delivery (market- and/or 
government-based regulation).  
4. In this paper, we address general issues related to infrastructure investment but focus on 
fixed networks, such as water/sanitation, energy and transport. These networks are interesting, 
because they require investment that is lumpy and largely irreversible, and therefore costly, which 
calls for considerable financing for instalment and maintenance. They also account for the bulk of 
infrastructure development budgets around the world and also often generate a future stream of 
revenue that accrues to the provider. Moreover, fixed networks concern most of the infrastructure 
investment already under way around the world and the bulk of demand for future investment. 
Infrastructure investment in other sectors, including for the provision of social services, such as 
health care and education, is discussed in Papers [3] and [13].  
5. This paper identifies a few general principles that should guide policymakers’ choices for 
financing infrastructure investment in a decentralised setting. By raising efficiency, there are 
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substantial savings to be made from the choice of appropriate financing, given that the costs of 
infrastructure investment are substantial. In particular:  
 
 The choice of financing instrument depends on the nature of the investment (size, 
revenue-generating capacity, potential for competition), the modality of service delivery 
(pure government provision, procurement, concession, PPP), the budgetary capacity of 
the jurisdiction (breadth and depth of own taxes, intergovernmental transfer 
arrangements, borrowing constraints), and the technical capacity of the jurisdiction to 
design and negotiate contracts with private-sector providers. 
 Financing options should maximise the welfare of local residents. Perception of the role 
of government matters and affects the willingness to pay for services. If local residents 
believe that provision, especially that financed locally, does not generate benefits that can 
be internalised by the local community, they are unlikely to be willing to pay for the 
services associated with the infrastructure. 
 Where subnational administrations remain important providers of infrastructure, better 
co-ordination mechanisms can help ensure that returns to scale are exploited and inter-
jurisdictional spillovers are taken into account, including through decision-making 
frameworks that bring together subnational and central governments, as well as other 
stakeholders. 
 On the financing side, subnational governments typically need to enhance their capacity 
to raise own revenue, to make the most of intergovernmental grants and transfers, and to 
mobilise private-sector funds, including by tapping capital markets, where permitted. 
They also need to strengthen their technical capacity to design and implement investment 
projects, as well as manage increasingly complex, multi-year budgets, especially when 
there is private-sector involvement. 
 To meet the infrastructure investment challenge, making better use of user charges, while 
dealing with associated affordability and equity drawbacks, can help make sure existing 
infrastructure that can generate revenue streams is used efficiently and identify where 
more infrastructure investment is needed, as well as creating more options for private-
sector involvement. 
6. The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes long-term global trends in 
investment and discusses estimates of future infrastructure investment needs. Section 3 presents a 
general framework for government interventions that highlights the specific characteristics of 
subnational governments. Section 4 discusses financing options for subnational governments 
ranging from budgetary sources (general revenue, intergovernmental grants and transfers, user 
charges, debt issuance) and private-sector co-financing. Section 5 concludes.    
 
2. Trends in infrastructure spending and future needs 
 
General trends and near-term outlook 
7. As noted in Paper [3], there is a dearth of internationally comparable data and long time-
series of government spending on infrastructure development, let alone associated recurrent 
outlays, such as operations and maintenance. Also, national accounts data on gross fixed capital 
formation do not usually distinguish between infrastructure and non-infrastructure investment. To 
the extent that both series move together, trends in infrastructure spending could be gauged, 
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although rather imperfectly, by those in overall gross fixed capital formation, which vary a great 
deal across countries (Figure 1). Investment patterns also differ across countries: typically, 
investment accounts for a larger share of GDP in fast-growing economies, such as China and 
India, than in the high-income OECD economies.  
 
Figure 1. Investment trends: International comparisons, 1960-2011 
 
Source: World Bank (World Development Indicators). 
8. Notwithstanding regional differences in infrastructure spending, there has been an increase 
in government investment, reflecting to a large extent counter-cyclical fiscal support in OECD 
countries and several emerging-market economies (OECD, 2011; World Bank, 2012). Stimulus 
packages accounted for 4 percent of GDP or more in some OECD countries (Australia, Canada, 
Korea, United States), with a strong focus on public investment, including labour-intensive 
infrastructure in sectors such as transport and urban utilities and on subnational levels of 
administration for the implementation of investment programmes. About three-quarters of the 
investment package announced by Korea and Spain was to be delivered by the subnational 
jurisdictions (OECD, 2011a). This crisis-driven expansion in investment is nevertheless losing 
impetus as support packages are unwound in some countries and as a result of ongoing fiscal 
consolidation in several OECD countries (OECD, 2012a).  
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9. Also, there are numerous factors, some of them structural, others stemming from the crisis, 
which will likely bear down on investment in the coming years. On the demand side, uncertainty 
about the near-term outlook for the global economy and the poor state of the public finances in 
many countries will likely constrain investment in the near term. On the supply side, despite 
historically low interest rates around the world, there is a dearth of financing due to ongoing bank 
deleveraging and financial sector impairment. At the same time, in some cases strict regulations 
governing the extent to which institutional investors are able to invest in infrastructure and other 
long-term projects.  
10. The composition of infrastructure investment between the government and the private 
sector has also changed over time. Efforts to leverage private-sector financing for investment and 
privatisation, motivated by the potential for enhancing the efficiency of government-owned 
enterprises through private ownership or management, has led to a decline in the government 
share of infrastructure investment in many countries (Chan et al., 2009; de Mello, 2012). A large 
share of infrastructure is already in private hands, especially in telecoms and to lesser extent 
power generation and railways. At the same time, technological change, not least in the ICT area, 
as well as regulatory reform to foster competition in otherwise uncompetitive markets, have 
altered the scope for government provision and facilitated the involvement of the private sector.  
 
Investment across government layers 
11. It is very difficult to compare trends in the composition of infrastructure investment across 
the different layers of administration, as discussed in Paper [2]. In the OECD area, over two-thirds 
of government investment, including infrastructure, are carried out at the subnational level. 
Internationally comparable data are very difficult to come by, even for very crude measures of 
infrastructure decentralisation and the associated financial flows across levels of administration, 
including capital transfers. Also, institutional settings vary a great deal across countries, involving 
different degrees of subnational participation in the design and financing of investment projects. 
As a result, conventional decentralisation indicators, such as the share of subnational capital 
expenditure in total public investment, can be misleading to the extent that subnational autonomy 
is not taken into consideration.  
12. Notwithstanding these caveats, the information available from the International Monetary 
Fund’s Government Finance Statistics on the acquisition of fixed assets at different levels of 
administration, which is computed on an accrual, rather than cash, basis, can be used as a metric 
for subnational infrastructure investment. On the basis of the indicators presented in Appendix 
Table 1 for OECD countries, middle-tier and local governments account for the lion’s share of 
government investment, at least as far as the ratio of acquisition of fixed assets to GDP is 
concerned. Of course, there are limitations to GFS data, including the fact that most countries do 
not report investment spending for the different layers of administration in a systematic manner 
and that in some cases investment is carried out through extra-budgetary funds that are not 
consolidated in the fiscal accounts.  
 
Future demand and needs 
13. Current spending levels may not be sufficient to meet future demand for infrastructure 
development and upgrading. A combination of low levels of investment and poor infrastructure in 
most developing and emerging-market economies begs the question of how much countries 
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should invest in infrastructure. However, the economic literature is rather limited in this area, 
reflecting to a large extent data limitations, even in the OECD area. The estimations reported by 
the OECD suggest that investments to the tune of 2.5 percent of world GDP are needed to 
improve the world’s infrastructure, especially in sectors such as roads, rail, telecoms, electricity 
(transmission and distribution) and water (OECD, 2007). If electricity generation and other 
energy-related investments in oil, gas and coal are taken into account, based on estimates by 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2010 and 2011), worldwide infrastructure investment needs 
could rise to 3.5 percent of world GDP per year through to 2030. Given that subnational 
governments, especially cities and local jurisdictions, account for lion’s share of government 
investment in mature economies, it is likely that they will remain at the forefront of service 
delivery in this area in the years to come (OECD, 2012b).  
14. At the same time, competing demands associated not least with population ageing will 
likely intensify and create additional claims on already stretched government budgets. To 
illustrate, government spending on health and long-term care alone is likely to increase from the 
current level of close to 7 percent of GDP in OECD countries to about 10-13 percent of GDP by 
2050, and outlays on old-age pensions are set to rise by 3-4 percentage points (OECD, 2007). 
Governments will find it increasingly difficult to finance future infrastructure investment from 
traditional sources. This is because the tax base may come under pressure through an ageing 
workforce, and medium-term fiscal consolidation needs associated with high levels of government 
indebtedness will constrain the ability of governments to finance investment through debt 
issuance.  
 
3. The scope for subnational provision of infrastructure 
 
15. Against a background of significant demand for infrastructure investment projected over 
the coming decades, often with the lion’s share of responsibility falling to subnational 
governments, rethinking how best to meet this challenge becomes increasingly important as 
pressure mounts on both subnational and central government budgets. To address the 
infrastructure challenge policymakers will need to reassess infrastructure priorities if funding 
cannot be guaranteed, whether the government remains best suited to take responsibility for 
provision and whether there are more effective ways to harness the private sector in the provision 
of infrastructure.  
General framework for government intervention
1
 
 
Addressing market failures 
16. Subnational provision of infrastructure needs to be set in a broader context of government 
intervention to address market failures that could result in the under-provision of infrastructure, 
when externalities or public-good features are predominant, or to limit the exercise of market 
power in the case of natural monopolies. The resulting decisions about ownership, delivery 
modality and regulation are important factors affecting the supply and demand of infrastructure 
(Figure 2). At the same time, and as discussed in Paper [4], the assignment of functions across the 
different layers of government depends on the institutional underpinnings of intergovernmental 
                                                     
1. This section draws on Sutherland et al. (2011). 
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fiscal relations, which are specific to different countries and set the parameters for subnational 
government involvement in infrastructure provision and financing.  
17. In general terms, the structure of infrastructure supply depends on the nature of the market 
failure to be addressed. In particular, in the case of externalities or public-good effects, the private 
sector would not provide the service, and decentralised government intervention would result in 
under-provision of the service relative to the social optimum. Under-provision arises because the 
costs of delivery would be borne by local residents whereas the benefits could accrue at least in 
part to neighbouring jurisdictions. In the case of natural monopolies, the private sector would 
usually be willing to provide the service, although normally at a level that is below, and a price 
that is above, the social optimum.  Dealing with either type of market failure calls for direct 
government provision and/or some type of arm’s length regulation for private-sector involvement, 
as well as intergovernmental fiscal arrangements (discussed below) to align the costs and benefits 
of provision to local taxpayers in the case of decentralised delivery. Due to the often extremely 
large fixed costs and the irreversibility of investment, investment decisions are also particularly 
sensitive to the regulatory environment.  
18. When the government is involved in infrastructure provision, investment decision-making 
should use the standard criterion of setting the level of provision that equates the marginal social 
benefit to the marginal social cost, which is related to the marginal costs of public funds and 
production costs. However, due to the characteristics of networks, the marginal benefits of 
additional investments are often low and declining, but not always, particularly in well-developed 
networks.  
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Figure 2. Factors affecting investment in infrastructure 
General framework and scope for subnational intervention  
Source: Based on Sutherland et al. (2012). 
 
Selecting appropriate delivery modes 
19. There are a number of different delivery modes involving the public or private sector to 
differing degrees. These include public ownership and procurement, which has often characterised 
the water supply and road networks; concessions and public-private partnerships (PPPs), which 
are increasingly involving the private sector in the delivery of infrastructure; and fully privately-
owned companies, which has often been the case in the energy sector.  
20. An important motivation for greater private sector involvement in infrastructure provision 
arises from harnessing their financial and technical expertise for investment and their managerial 
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abilities in managing large construction projects and in some cases subsequent operation of the 
infrastructure.  
21. At one extreme, the private sector will provide and operate the infrastructure themselves, 
particularly when it is a natural monopoly and user fees are feasible. In this case, the state needs to 
provide an appropriate regulatory environment (see below). When entry is possible, new 
infrastructure can be wholly owned and provided by the private sector, such as in the case of 
electricity generation. When entry is difficult – for example, planning requirements impose 
important obstacles or infrastructure already exists – the private sector may be involved through 
franchises or concessions, largely to operate existing infrastructure, and public-private 
partnerships (PPPs), to construct and operate new assets.  
22. Franchises or concessions and PPPs occupy a middle ground between public and private 
provision. In part, this is due to the public good nature of the services, for which the sub-central 
government is directly accountable to the population, as well as distributional concerns. In this 
context, the public sector may wish to remain involved in decisions regarding investment, 
management of infrastructure assets and provision of services.  
23. At the other end of the spectrum, the public sector will involve the private sector through 
traditional procurement while retaining ownership of, and managerial responsibility for, the 
infrastructure asset. This type of arrangement arises when the sub-central government finds it 
easier to specify the infrastructure asset than the service it wants to provide, which may also be 
difficult to monitor. In this light, building the local road network may be something easier to 
specify ex ante rather than designing a contact based on local road network availability or usage.  
 
 Setting appropriate regulation  
24. The regulatory framework needs to focus on the desired market structure (reflecting the 
degree to which competition is possible), access regimes and pricing, which play important roles 
in determining infrastructure supply and use. In particular, the regulator often needs to set user 
costs, access prices or final prices, depending on whether the network provider is vertically 
integrated and competition is feasible. Under certain conditions, setting the price equal to the 
marginal social cost would be welfare maximising and when the networks are characterised by 
constant returns to scale this form of pricing would also cover investment costs. Alternatively, the 
regulator may adopt an alternative pricing structure to cover investment costs. Given the 
importance of pricing to investment decisions, the credibility and consistency of the regulatory 
framework are important determinants of infrastructure investment.  
25. Infrastructure in the network sectors is also often a congestible public good with 
congestion-raising production costs and reducing individuals’ utility. When pricing is introduced, 
the optimal toll—determined by the difference between the marginal social cost (reflecting 
congestion costs and wear and tear of the infrastructure) and private costs—will reduce demand 
and, by enhancing the efficient use of existing infrastructure, will damp the need for investment in 
additional capacity. Efficient investment decisions would then equate marginal costs to the 
marginal benefits of infrastructure capacity and quality, which the revenues from the congestion 
toll would indicate when additional investment is warranted.  
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Decentralisation and government provision of infrastructure: insights from the literature   
26. Although subnational jurisdictions account for the bulk of government investment, the 
public finance literature is surprisingly limited on the possible effects of fiscal decentralisation on 
infrastructure provision. The Oatesian and Musgravean traditions of fiscal federalism place 
limited emphasis on the composition of public investment across the different layers of 
administration. The basic argument is that, as noted above, public investment is best carried out 
and financed by higher levels of administration because of externality/network effects, which 
discourage subnational provision and result in a sub-optimal supply of public investment. 
Economies of scale in production and service delivery are common in fixed networks and also 
discourage subnational provision, especially by small jurisdictions (de Mello and Lago-Peñas, 
2011). Horizontal tax competition, which is likely to arise from the decentralisation of revenue 
sources to lower levels of administration, could result in sub-optimal investment under certain 
conditions (Hulten and Schwab, 1997).  
27. The empirical literature provides some, albeit limited, validation to the under-provision 
hypothesis. The cross-country analysis reported by de Mello (2012) suggests that decentralisation, 
measured by the share of subnational revenue in total revenue, encourages aggregate investment 
(gross fixed capital formation), although it is associated with lower investment at the subnational 
level (acquisition of fixed assets). In the case of Latin America, greater decentralisation is 
associated not only with lower subnational government investment but also with economy-wide 
gross fixed capital formation.   
28. By contrast, another strand of literature shows that decentralisation could result in over-
provision of infrastructure at the subnational level. One argument is that competition among 
same-level jurisdictions could affect the composition of expenditure, leading subnational 
governments to over-invest in public goods that would make their jurisdictions attractive to 
private investment (Keen and Marchand, 1997). Decentralisation could therefore be associated 
with higher levels of subnational spending on infrastructure projects, a result that is validated by 
the cross-country evidence reported by Estache and Sinha (1995), which suggests that more 
decentralised countries, especially in the developing world, tend to spend more (total and 
subnational) on infrastructure projects. More recent evidence reported by Kappeler and Välilä 
(2008) for European countries also shows that decentralisation tilts the composition of public 
investment towards more productive projects, notably infrastructure, a finding that the authors 
attribute to increased fiscal competition brought about by decentralisation.  
29. Overprovision does not imply that the benefits of infrastructure are shared equally. 
Bardhan and Mookherjee (2006) find that decentralisation of infrastructure does indeed increase 
the supply of services at the local level, given that local policymakers are more responsive to local 
needs than central government officials, but it also leads to overprovision of services to local 
elites to the detriment of other social groups. As for financing, they find that user charges 
improves local welfare more than intergovernmental transfers, regardless of the degree of local 
capture. Evidence for Spain (Esteller and Solé, 2005), Bolivia and Colombia (Faguet, 2004), and 
Indonesia (Chowdhury et al., 2007) also suggest that decentralisation makes investment decisions 
more responsive to local preferences and needs, which in turn improves the composition of the 
capital stock among the subnational jurisdictions.  
30. The empirical literature, although limited, provides some evidence on the links between 
decentralised provision and the quality of infrastructure. For example, Humplick and Estache 
(1995) estimate the effect of decentralisation on the performance of several infrastructure projects, 
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including roads, electricity, and water. Using different measures of decentralisation in each sector, 
the authors find that at least one performance indicator improved in each sector as a result of 
decentralisation, although the correlation between decentralisation and performance remains fairly 
weak in general. However, in some cases, the decentralised provision of infrastructure was 
subsequently reversed, such as the responsibility for road investment in Bolivia.  
31. All in all, there are theoretical arguments and empirical evidence suggesting a link 
between decentralised provision, on the one hand, and the level and quality of infrastructure, on 
the other. The cross-country empirical literature nevertheless does not provide conclusive 
evidence, suggesting that there is much scope for future research in this area and that country-
specific circumstances and characteristics need to be taken into account.  
 
4. Financing options for subnational governments 
32. To each delivery mode identified in Figure 2 corresponds different financing options, 
which need to be tailored to the needs and capacity of subnational governments, the scope and 
modalities for private-sector involvement, and the institutional settings for intergovernmental 
fiscal relations. By and large, and as discussed in Paper [4], financial options can be of two types: 
i) budget appropriations (general revenue, debt, intergovernmental grants and transfers, user 
charges), and ii) private-sector co-financing (concessions, PPPs). Of course, these options are not 
mutually exclusive; for example, to the extent that public funding is required for projects 
involving private-sector co-financing, a claim is placed on budget appropriations  
33. The choice of financing options is not without consequences for the delivery of 
infrastructure services. They depend on the budgetary and administrative capacity of the 
subnational jurisdictions, the institutional framework for intergovernmental fiscal relations, the 
mechanisms for oversight of government operations, and the incentives for risk management and 
private sector involvement (Table 1). These issues will be discussed in greater detail below.  
34. The way public infrastructure is financed can also affect its benefits. Funding 
infrastructure spending by taxes could promote growth if the marginal productivity gains arising 
from the tax-financed investment exceed the adverse impact of higher taxes. Debt financing could 
also be desirable to the extent that the investments it finances create a future stream of earnings to 
the government that meets debt service requirements. In the case of PPPs, efficiency gains can be 
generated if market risk is shared appropriately between the government and the private-sector 
partner.  
 
12 International Center for Public Policy Working Paper Series 
 
 
Table 1. Characteristics of financing modalities: A summary 
 Budget appropriations Private-sector co-financing (procurement, 
concessions, PPPs)   General revenue Debt Intergovernmental 
grants and transfers 
User charges 
Subnational 
budgetary and 
administrative 
capacity  
Conditional on the 
revenue mobilisation 
capacity of subnational 
governments 
Conditional on the rules 
governing subnational 
financial management 
and borrowing 
Constrained by 
subnational 
administrative capacity 
(conditional and 
matching grants may be 
cumbersome)  
Constrained by 
willingness/ability to 
pay  
Constrained by subnational administrative 
capacity 
Intergovernmental 
fiscal relations 
Depends on the 
assignment of tax bases 
to subnational 
governments and their 
policymaking autonomy 
Subnational borrowing 
is often subject to 
administrative and/or 
prudential controls 
imposed by the centre 
Depends on the design 
of grants and transfer 
system  
Often under the 
purview of subnational 
governments 
Subnational governments often have their own 
legal framework for partnerships 
Scope for private-
sector involvement 
No scope No or limited scope In principle no scope, 
unless specified by 
recipient jurisdiction  
Depends on ownership 
structure of project 
Scope depends on ownership structure and 
risk-sharing between government and private-
sector partner 
Oversight Local legislature; local 
capture problems 
Local legislature, 
central or middle-tier 
government and 
markets; local capture 
problems 
Local and higher-level 
legislature; local 
capture problem 
Local legislature and 
market; could reduce 
risk of local capture 
Local and higher-level legislature; market 
oversight is strengthened if project is carried 
out by listed public enterprise 
Incentives for risk 
management and 
potential for 
enhancing 
competition 
Depends on oversight 
mechanisms and 
accountability of local 
policymakers 
Low, depends on 
oversight mechanisms, 
including markets, and 
accountability of local 
policymakers; specific-
purpose bonds could 
provide stronger 
incentives  
Low to medium, 
depends on the design 
of grants, incentive to 
inflate costs of projects; 
matching grants could 
provide stronger 
incentives 
Medium to high, could 
provide stronger 
incentives due to 
greater transparency 
and inter-jurisdictional 
comparability 
Medium to high, depends on capacity to 
ensure appropriate risk sharing between 
government and private-sector partner 
Source: Authors’ elaboration.
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Budgetary appropriations: general revenue, debt, intergovernmental grants and transfers, 
user charges 
35. The sunk costs associated with public investment are often too high to be fully 
financed by subnational budgets, whose revenue mobilisation and borrowing capacity is 
lower than that of higher levels of administration. Higher levels of administration therefore 
participate in the financing of subnational provision through transfers and grants, even when 
investments are carried out entirely by subnational jurisdictions. The scope for user charges 
depends more broadly on the pricing regime for infrastructure projects and on the 
willingness/ability to pay of local residents as well as the capacity to collect fees for 
infrastructure use.  
 
General revenue 
36. Subnational governments tend to have lower revenue mobilisation capacity than the 
central government, which limits their ability to finance costly investments in fixed networks 
out of their general budgets. On the basis of conventional public finance principles, the tax 
bases that can efficiently be assigned to subnational governments, such as property, are 
narrower than those that are typically assigned to the central government, such as personal 
and corporate income. Arrangements differ considerably across countries, and in many cases, 
the central and the subnational governments also share the revenue of some taxes, including 
those on income and consumption, which may enhance subnational revenue.  
37. Subnational governments also often rely on the earmarking of the revenue from own 
or shared taxes to finance public investment. Revenue earmarking ensures that funds are 
allocated to activities – including operations and maintenance – that might otherwise be 
undersupplied once investments come to fruition. However, revenue earmarking complicates 
expenditure management and discourages efforts to improve the cost-effectiveness of 
government expenditures, because policymakers are unable to reallocate scarce budgetary 
resources to cost-effective activities. This practice is widespread in Latin America, and much 
less prevalent in OECD countries, although provisions vary considerably across (de Mello, 
2012). For example, in OECD countries, motor vehicle taxes or fuel duties are sometimes 
earmarked for road investment.  
38. Financing of investment projects through revenue earmarking is subject to the same 
oversight procedures as the general budget, which is carried out by subnational legislatures 
(and in some cases by the central government). Some countries also condition the creation of 
expenditure mandates to the availability of financing, which encourages a discussion during 
the budget process on the costs and benefits of investments and the trade-offs at may exist 
among different interventions.  
39. A final potential source of government funding comes from improvement levies. In 
this case, the government can levy a charge on those benefiting from infrastructure provision 
to defray investment costs. In OECD countries, (local) governments frequently charge 
improvement levies to real estate developers to cover the expenses of extending infrastructure 
to the new developments. More contentiously and thereby less frequent, existing inhabitants 
or businesses can face an additional levy for improvements of or new additions to 
infrastructure.  
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Debt 
40. Debt financing is often used in the case of costly investment projects, often with long 
maturities, that cannot be financed by the general budget and which generate future benefits 
to the population and yield a stream of revenue that can be used to service the debt. However, 
when subnational governments can borrow directly from capital markets, particularly when 
they have limited revenue raising capacity, such borrowing may be perceived as implicitly 
guaranteed by central government. As a result, subnational governments can take on too 
much borrowing, thereby forcing the central government to bail them out. Against the 
backdrop of a possible breakdown in fiscal responsibility, subnational governments, 
especially in developing countries and emerging-market economies, often face restrictions on 
borrowing in the form of outright bans (such as on foreign borrowing, for example), 
administrative restrictions (such as central government approval) and/or prudential 
regulations (such as limits based on debt service capacity and debt ceilings). Arrangements 
vary considerably across countries. For example, borrowing is allowed in most European 
countries subject to a golden rule; that is, long-term borrowing is allowed to finance capital 
expenditure only. More flexible arrangements involve prudential requirements based on debt 
service parameters (de Mello, 2010), whereas in Latin America subnational borrowing is 
severely constrained (Martinez-Vazquez, 2010).  
41. Governments often set up financial institutions, such as investment banks, to provide 
dedicated financing for investment, in particular infrastructure development projects. The 
logic of setting up such banks is that the private financial sector may be unable (due to 
financial shallowness) or unwilling (due to some market failure) to provide long-term 
financing for large infrastructure development projects. In addition to well known governance 
challenges associated with the management of public financial institutions, risks include the 
possibility that an active government involvement in long-term investment financing may 
actually inhibit the development of private-sector financing, rather than overcoming obstacles 
to infrastructure development.  
42. Decisions on whether or not to finance infrastructure projects through the issuance of 
debt, were permitted, are guided by the usual financial parameters, although borrowing costs 
tend to be higher for subnational governments than the central government (de Mello, 2001). 
In this case, on-lending by higher levels of administration would provide less onerous 
financing for subnational provision. Debt financing also depends on the depth of national 
capital markets and the tax regime for investment in subnational securities (in some countries, 
including the United States, investment in local government bonds is exempted from income 
tax).  
43. In the case of debt financing, oversight is often extended to subnational legislatures 
and other agencies responsible for ensuring compliance with administrative and/or prudential 
regulations on subnational borrowing. In some cases, market mechanisms may also exert 
pressures for enhanced fiscal discipline at the subnational level.    
 
Intergovernmental grants and transfers 
44. There is considerable variation across countries on the types of grants from higher 
levels of administration used to finance infrastructure projects. Intergovernmental grants and 
transfers can help overcome subnational government revenue shortfalls, allowing them to 
take on major infrastructure projects. However, in the absence of co-ordination mechanisms, 
investment decisions may fail to take into account the consequences for other subnational 
jurisdictions possibly leading to under-provision. Similarly local investment decisions can be 
 Financing Infrastructure 15  
 
at variance with national priorities. In response to these problems, central governments can 
attempt to influence infrastructure provision by making grants conditional.  
45. Block grants allow the recipient jurisdiction greater managerial autonomy than do 
conditional or matching grants, which require financial counterparts and/or impose 
constraints on the use of funds by the recipient jurisdiction. In many respects, co-financing by 
different levels of government is similar to conditional or matching grants. Conditionality is 
often introduced in intergovernmental transfer systems to deal with externalities in 
subnational provision, although in practice the design of conditional grants is complicated by 
the fact that externalities are not directly observable. These grants may also be complex to 
administer. In turn, matching grants are used in some cases to ensure financing for recurrent 
spending associated with operations and maintenance once infrastructure projects come on 
stream.  
46. While recognising that different grants serve different purposes, there is a trend 
towards increased flexibility in the grant system around the world. For example, conditional 
and matching grants are hardly used at all in Latin America, where revenue earmarking is 
more widespread, as discussed above, and are being replaced by block grants in most 
European countries. Experience within the OECD also demonstrates that sectoral or 
functional earmarking can be relaxed without risking under-provision of infrastructure, 
particularly when local residents hold subnational governments accountable for infrastructure 
investment. Heightened demands for local self-governance are also resulting in the 
replacement of conditional grants by block grants. However, this is not always the case and in 
reaction to failures at the subnational level, further conditioning by central governments is a 
possible response.  
47. As in the case of the creation of dedicated financial institutions (discussed above), 
governments often establish development funds to channel -- essentially subsidised loans 
and/or grants -- to finance infrastructure development in lagging regions. Resources often 
come from the budgetary sources, including through the earmarking of specific revenues, but 
the existence of such mechanisms poses challenges because funds are seldom disbursed in a 
transparent, contestable manner. It is also difficult to assess the cost-effectiveness of these 
dedicated support mechanisms and the role they play in regional development.  
48. While the management of intergovernmental grants and transfers is subject to 
conventional budgetary oversight, the wedge that they drive between the costs and benefits of 
subnational delivery is known to create perverse incentives for decentralised fiscal 
policymaking. This is especially of “common pool” problems, which encourage the recipient 
jurisdiction to overspend due to an underestimation of provision costs (de Mello, 2000). 
 
User charges 
49. When infrastructure is not financed from taxation (either wholly or in part) user 
charges represent the other principal source of funding. In OECD countries, user charges are 
most commonly levied for transport services, water supply and wastewater treatment, and 
waste. User charges can account for a substantial source of subnational government revenue, 
although considerable heterogeneity exists across countries partly depending on whether the 
public or private sector provides these services.  When the public sector is the provider, 
revenue to all levels of government from user charges are around 2.5 percent of GDP on 
average for the OECD. In federal countries the subnational government share is around three-
quarters while in unitary countries this drops to around one half.   
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50. User charges are attractive as they can provide more than simply a source of revenue. 
By putting a price on service provision, user charges can influence demand, which is 
particularly useful for congestible public goods. As discussed above, the price signal needed 
to address congestion will reveal where new infrastructure is needed and provide 
funding.  However, the use of road and congestion pricing varies enormously across countries 
despite substantial costs associated with congestion. Within Europe, estimated costs of 
congestion of around 2 percent of GDP are not uncommon, but relatively few countries have 
explicit congestion charging schemes (Kozluk, 2010).
2
  
51. Another attraction is that pricing can help internalise environmental and other 
externalities. The externalities can be significant for some types of infrastructure typically 
provided by subnational governments, such as water supply and wastewater. In practice, 
pricing infrastructure and associated services often fails to cover operating costs, yet alone 
capital and external costs. In the water sector, charging for wastewater treatment has 
increasingly been levied separately as costs have risen due to tightening environmental 
standards. But for water supply, while tariffs account for the lion’s share of operating costs, 
full-cost recovery remains rare. Differences in water price levels are considerable, with price 
levels lower and the gap to full-cost recovery often larger in countries where water is scarce 
(OECD, 2010b).  
52. Regardless of the financing arrangements for investment projects, attention is 
typically placed on the capital expenditure per se, and the recurrent costs of operations and 
maintenance are often neglected.
3
 This is often related to politicians preferring supporting 
new, highly visible projects at the expense of the upkeep of existing infrastructure assets 
(Romp and De Haan, 2007).  
53. A major drawback with user charges centers on their interaction with affordability and 
the distribution of income. This is because user charges, especially for essential services, can 
account for noticeable shares of household disposable income, creating a financial burden 
that can fall disproportionately on the poor, as discussed in Paper [7]. As a result, pricing 
mechanisms may introduce some cross-subsidisation, as in the case of increasing block tariffs 
for water supply, or in other cases, revenues from user charges can be used (at least in part) to 
finance (preferably means tested) transfers to poorer households that would facilitate access 
to services while addressing equity considerations.  
54. A second complication arises in whether or not local governments possess the 
administrative capacity to implement user charges. Investments in collection, monitoring and 
pricing technology can represent a sizeable financial burden which, combined with 
difficulties in setting prices effectively, may limit the potential gains from introducing user 
charges. However, to some extent, technological change has transformed the landscape in 
recent years in areas such as transport, allowing subnational governments to introduce quite 
complex pricing mechanisms in both OECD countries and emerging-market economies. In 
this light, some of the barriers to implementing user charges may be falling, but they will still 
represent an important obstacle in many cases.  
                                                     
2. The costs of congestions arise due to a number of factors. Businesses costs rise due to the extra time needed 
for travel and the greater unreliability of travel time. Individuals are not productive in traffic jams and with the 
prospect of spending considerable time commuting they may limit their geographical area of job search. The 
combination of these factors is likely to lower welfare and reduce long-term growth.  
3. For example, Peru attempted to decentralise much of its road network to provincial and municipal 
governments but failed to provide financing for the associated recurrent expenditures, which resulted in a 
widespread deterioration of the network and ultimately recentralisation. In Brazil, federal assistance is now 
provided to those states that have accepted to take on responsibility for maintaining federal roads in their 
jurisdictions. 
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Private-sector involvement 
 
Financing modalities: Concessions, PPPs 
55. No single model of private-sector involvement in infrastructure investment has 
emerged across countries. However, over time OECD countries have generally moved away 
from investment by public enterprises and towards public procurement, concessions and more 
recently PPPs. This is also the case beyond the OECD area, including many countries in 
Latin America. One factor influencing the particular choice of procurement versus 
concessions and PPPs is whether the infrastructure assets raise revenue. When it is possible to 
raise revenue, a wider range of financing options are available, which would otherwise be 
largely limited to traditional public procurement.  
56. In the different models involving the private sector, tendering introduces competition 
either for the public procurement contract or ex-ante for the market (Demsetz, 1968). In this 
context, the subnational government’s capacity to manage the tendering process effectively 
determines whether potential benefits are harnessed. For example, the upfront contracting 
costs for PPPs are typically substantially greater than traditional procurement, making PPPs 
less attractive for subnational governments with limited experience and lacking the technical 
skills to negotiate effectively with the private sector. In this context, enhancing subnational 
governments’ capacity to negotiate complex deals and select the most efficient bidder 
acquires some importance (World Bank, 2012).  
57. With different models of private-sector involvement available, subnational 
governments need to guard against choices that may be convenient in the short term but may 
turn out to be costly later on. For example, interest in PPPs can arise to overcome budgetary 
constraints, which may be imposed by fiscal rules, or in an attempt to disguise pressure on the 
public finances. A proper and transparent assessment of the expected long-term impact on 
public finances and accounting for associated contingent liabilities for the different possible 
models would help ensure that the most appropriate choice is made (OECD, 2008).  
58. Additional consequences of short-termism may also arise for other reasons. Due to the 
electoral cycle, the relatively short period officials may be in office -- when measured in 
comparison with the life of an investment project -- can introduce uncertainty about the 
subnational government’s commitment to the project in the future. In other cases, dependence 
on transfer arrangements, which underpin subnational government involvement, may also 
raise concern about project sustainability. In such cases, the increased uncertainty would 
induce the private sector to demand a higher rate of return on their investment, which could 
make the investment unattractive.  
59. In contrast to public procurement, concessions and PPPs involve private-sector co-
financing, with the choice between them largely determined by the risk characteristics of the 
project. There are many overlapping issues as contracts for concessions and PPPs are 
unavoidably incomplete and long-term in nature, requiring on-going monitoring and control 
during the life of the project (Araújo and Sutherland, 2010; also discussed in Paper [9]). First, 
contract design needs to ensure an appropriate and effective transfer of risks and 
responsibilities to the private sector. A second area of overlap is mitigating investment hold-
up throughout the life of the contract. Third, lengthier contractual relationships require scope 
for flexibility, as output specifications and service standards can become obsolete during the 
life of the contract. Finally, since governments are effectively the provider of last resort for 
often very visible public goods, mechanisms to minimize the potential for opportunistic 
behaviour from both parties and costly renegotiation need to be considered, notwithstanding 
the need for flexibility.  
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60. Concessions require the private sector to bear significant demand risk. The 
concessionaire operates and finances the maintenance of the asset but is generally not 
involved in its construction though may be responsible for maintenance, as discussed in Paper 
[8]. Usually the underlying infrastructure asset remains public property. For the private 
sector, user charges constitute the bulk of revenues and many concession contracts do not 
envisage any payment from the government and sometimes involve a payment to the 
government for the concession. This implies that the level of demand risk transferred to the 
private sector is relatively large.  
61. A PPP contract, by transferring both construction and the operation of the 
infrastructure asset, including its maintenance, implies greater and sometimes longer private-
sector participation compared to traditional procurement or a concession. Due to the 
infrastructure being new, the private sector may be reluctant to bear the demand risk without 
some co-financing or guarantees from government (Andres and Guasch, 2008).  
62. PPPs potentially bring a number of advantages. Requiring outside financing entails 
greater project scrutiny and a better evaluation of the potential risks as well as better 
monitoring of the private contractor. Second, PPPs, by bundling the construction and the 
operation phases, create incentives for the private contractor to internalise operational and 
maintenance costs during the construction phase (Hart, 2003). The private partner will seek to 
identify the design and construction options that can potentially minimise the costs of 
construction and provide better service quality throughout the life of the project.
4
  
63. But PPPs are not always easy to get right. The OECD Principles for Private Sector 
Participation in Infrastructure adopted in 2007 offer a checklist of policy issues to consider 
when setting up PPPs, including an assessment of the relative long-term costs and benefits 
and availability of finance, taking into account the pricing of risks transferred to the private 
operators and prudent fiscal treatment of risks remaining in the public domain; the an 
enabling policy framework for investment; and the capacities at all levels of government to 
implement projects. The experience of OECD countries shows that PPPs can obscure real 
spending and make government actions un-transparent, using off-budget financing, which 
makes can be potentially risky for fiscal management and sustainability.  
 
Supply-side considerations 
64. In most countries, bank loans have traditionally been the most important private 
source of financing for infrastructure investment. However, deleveraging by banks after the 
crisis and new banking regulations are taking their toll on the ability of banks to provide 
credit for infrastructure development. The OECD estimates that the global volume of new 
project finance, about USD 65 billion, was one-third lower in the first quarter of 2012 than in 
the previous year. In European countries, the fall in the number of announced deals was felt 
in both large transport infrastructure projects and also in the education sector, where deals are 
typically much smaller. To some extent, the fall in new project financing may be a temporary 
response to the ongoing crisis, but how much and how fast project financing recovers remains 
an open question.   
65. Institutional investors, such as pension funds, insurance companies and mutual funds, 
are another important source of private-sector financing for infrastructure. These investors 
                                                     
4. By combining private sector innovation and financing as well as the sharing of risks in innovative ways 
PPPs can represent value for money for the public sector and a fair deal for the private sector. The OECD 
estimates that there are about USD 0.8 trillion worth of projects in operation under PPP arrangements in OECD 
countries. 
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currently hold over USD 70 trillion in assets under management in OECD countries alone 
and, if emerging-market economies are taken into account, including their Sovereign Wealth 
Funds (with over USD 4 trillion in assets), the potential pool of financing for infrastructure 
investment is considerably larger (OECD, 2010a). Pension funds alone have assets under 
management to the tune of USD 29 trillion and annual inflows of about USD 850 billion in 
OECD countries. However, the OECD estimates that less than 1 percent of the pension funds’ 
investment portfolios is allocated directly to infrastructure projects.  
66. Given their volume of assets under management, and the relatively low share of their 
investments in infrastructure, institutional investors are the main potential sources of 
financing for long-term infrastructure investment. However, there are limitations to the 
ability of institutional investors to redirect their asset portfolios to infrastructure projects, 
including not least regulatory restrictions on portfolio allocation and risk management 
considerations related to the tenor and currency composition of investment portfolios. Policy 
reforms to improve the regulatory framework for institutional investors, for instance by 
removing investment regulatory barriers and helping investors address long-term risks, would 
contribute to facilitating investment by institutional investors.
5
  
67. Of course, not all countries have access to private-sector funds and capital markets to 
raise the necessary financing for infrastructure. In that case, foreign assistance constitutes an 
obvious instrument. However, the OECD estimates that the share of Oversees Development 
Finance (ODF) in total infrastructure investment is rather modest (OECD, 2011b) and, in a 
challenging budgetary environment in many donor countries, it is likely that ODF will come 
under pressure, stressing the need to harness private sources of finance even in countries that 
currently rely heavily on foreign assistance. Setting up an appropriate framework for private 
sector involvement, including capacity building, is therefore critical in those countries, and 
recent OECD estimates suggest that about one-fifth of ODF for infrastructure in Africa is 
allocated to setting up and/or improving these framework conditions.  
 
Horizontal arrangements: dealing with scale effects in subnational provision  
68. Although the disincentives for provision arising from scale effects and inter-
jurisdictional externalities are conventionally dealt with through conditionality in the 
intergovernmental grants and transfer systems, there are alternative, more horizontal 
mechanisms to deal with these challenges. This is the case of the inter-municipal consortia 
that are currently in place in many countries and allow neighbouring local governments to set 
up – most often on a voluntary basis – single- or multiple-purpose agencies and/or local 
enterprises to provide local services to residents of different jurisdictions.
6
  
69. Such horizontal arrangements are widespread in Europe, especially for the provision 
of transport, urban waste management, water supply, fire fighting and hospital administration 
by local governments, and arrangements vary considerably across countries (Hulst and van 
Montfort, 2007). Norway also has an interesting experience with joint ownership of power 
plants, which allows neighbouring jurisdictions to cut costs in providing energy services. In 
Latin America, the Brazilian experience with inter-municipal consortia in the area of hospital 
administration is rather rare in the region. These horizontal arrangements are important tools 
                                                     
5. It is in this context that the OECD launched in 2007 the OECD Principles for Private Sector Participation in 
Infrastructure.   
6. The empirical evidence reported by de Mello and Lago-Peñas (2012) for Brazil and Spain suggest that the 
presence of economies of scale in service delivery provides incentives for subnational governments to provide 
services jointly.    
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for local governments to improve the cost-effectiveness of provision while satisfying 
demands for local autonomy.  
70. It is true that such benefits could also potentially arise from the consolidation of local 
governments into larger units through mergers and amalgamations, for example, but 
international experience shows that in many cases there is considerable political and public 
opinion resistance to consolidation (Martinez-Vazquez and Gomez-Reino, 2008). In addition, 
the benefits of proximity between the government and the citizenry, which has much scope 
for making the government more responsive to local preferences and needs and for 
strengthening social control over government operations, would also likely be lost through 
consolidations. Weighing the benefits and costs of alternative governance arrangements is of 
course an empirical question, but institutional arrangements change only slowly and the 
structure of local governments, while far from immutable, are not often amenable to 
experimentation.
7
  
 
5. Conclusions 
71. The need for infrastructure building, replacement and updating is large worldwide. In 
the areas of electricity, telecoms and water alone, investment requirements are estimated by 
the OECD at about 2.5 percent of world GDP per year through to 2030. To foot the bill, 
governments will need to mobilise budgetary resources while at the same time delivering 
medium-term fiscal consolidation to restore the sustainability of public finances in many 
OECD countries. Demands associated with health and long-term care in ageing OECD 
societies and for enhanced social protection in many developing and emerging-market 
economies will also put an increasingly heavy burden on government budgets.  
72. Middle-tier and local administrations will bear the brunt of the pressures associated 
with growing demands for infrastructure. Subnational governments already carry out, and 
sometimes finance, the bulk of government investment – about two-thirds on average in the 
OECD area – a ratio that is unlikely to change in the years to come. To better prepare 
subnational governments for the challenge ahead, this paper provided a general discussion on 
the factors affecting investment in infrastructure (with emphasis on fixed networks) that 
could serve as a framework for subnational intervention. The specific characteristics of the 
different financing modalities applicable to subnational governments were presented to 
highlight the challenges that are specific to subnational governments.  
73. The central argument presented above is that, on the financing side, subnational 
governments will need to enhance their capacity to raise own revenue, to make the most of 
intergovernmental grants and transfers, and to mobilise private-sector funds, including by 
tapping capital markets, where permitted. In order to exploit fully the various financing 
options, subnational governments in many countries will need to strengthen their technical 
capacity to design and implement investment projects, as well as manage increasingly 
complex, multi-year budgets, especially when there is private sector involvement.  
74. Making better use of user charges while addressing associated affordability and equity 
challenges can help ensure existing infrastructure is used efficiently and identify where more 
infrastructure investment is needed. User charges also generally offer more options for 
private-sector involvement; in particular, different types of concessions, franchise 
arrangements and public-private partnerships for revenue generating infrastructure services 
are amenable to private-sector co-financing. However, these forms of financing are not 
                                                     
7. For some recent empirical evidence on the benefits and costs of consolidation, see Steiner (2003) for 
Germany, Sorensen (2006) and Dafflon and Ruegg (2001) for Switzerland. 
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always suitable and the authorities need to assess the high upfront transaction costs that are 
typically incurred, and how risk is best allocated between the government and the private 
sector.  
75. Where subnational administrations are important providers of infrastructure, better co-
ordination mechanisms can help ensure that returns to scale are exploited and inter-
jurisdictional spillovers are taken into account. In this context, decision-making frameworks 
that bring together subnational and central governments as well as other stakeholders could 
help increase the efficiency of investment.  
76. Finally, in some cases, governments may need to rethink the boundaries of the state. 
Advances in technology, contracting and regulation allow infrastructure, such as telecoms 
and much of energy, which was often provided by government, to migrate to the private 
sector. Setting the appropriate regulatory framework will be important for encouraging 
investment in these cases.  
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Appendix Table 2.Public investment across levels of government: OECD countries  
 
Acquisition of fixed capital in  percent of GDP, accrual basis, averages since 1995 
 General Different layers of government 
 Government Central Middle-tier Local 
 Investment Total 
outlays 
Investment Total 
outlays 
Investment Total 
outlays 
Investment Total 
outlays 
   Chile 1.4 20.5 1.2 20.5 .. .. 0.2 2.6 
   Italy 0.6 47.8 -0.2 39.0 .. .. 0.8 15.0 
   Japan 1.1 37.8 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
   Spain 1.9 38.6 0.4 27.3 0.8 13.6 0.7 6.1 
   France 0.7 52.6 0.1 45.5 .. .. 0.6 10.4 
   Mexico
1
 .. .. 0.5 15.9 .. 7.0 .. 1.4 
   United Kingdom 0.5 42.0 0.0 38.9 .. .. 0.5 12.1 
   Australia 0.6 34.5 0.1 25.3 0.4 13.9 0.2 2.3 
   Germany -0.1 46.5 0.0 30.9 0.0 13.1 -0.1 7.2 
   Switzerland
1
 2.2 37.4 0.1 20.1 1.1 14.6 1.0 9.6 
   United States 1.2 36.3 0.1 21.0 .. .. .. .. 
   Canada
1
 2.3 40.7 0.3 18.7 1.0 21.4 1.0 7.4 
1. Cash basis. 
Source: International Monetary Fund (Government Finance Statistics). 
 
 
